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Determining the "Line of Commerce" Under
Section Seven of the Clayton Act
I. baNODUCTION

A provision of the antitrust statutes currently receiving a great deal
of publicity is the anti-merger section of the Clayton Act-section 7.1
The statute prohibits the acquisition by one corporation of stock or
assets of another corporation, "where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-2
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
It is designed to eliminate the merger as a means to amassing monopoly power by prohibiting at its incipiency the lessening of competition or the creation of monopoly power through merger. A finding of
actual anti-competitive effects is not required; only a "reasonable
probability" of such effects is necessary. 3
Two major issues appear in any section 7 litigation: (1) what
probable anti-competitive effects satisfy the requirements of substantially lessening competition or tending toward monopoly; and (2)
what is the market area within which the effects of the merger are
to be analyzed, both the geographic market area and the product or
services market, the "line of commerce." 4
Competition, of course, requires some market in which to occur;
the statute, thus, manifestly requires what otherwise is still needed
in accurately analyzing the effect of a merger on competition-defining
a relevant product or services market. In the analysis of a merger, the
product or services market in which competition is affected must be
well defined to predict accurately the probable anti-competitive effects
which might result. In considering proposed mergers, moreover, business firms must be able to determine the line or lines of commerce
which the merger might affect, in order to predict whether such
a merger would have the probable anti-competitive effects prohibited
by section 7.
One reason why the judicial development of section 7 has been
1. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
2. Section 7 reads in pertinent part as follows: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly." 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
3. ATTry. GEN.NAT'L CoMm. ANITRUST tBP. 118 1949).
4 ATTY.GEN.NAT'L COM'. ANTITRusT REP. 118 (1955).
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so severely criticized 5 is that neither the Federal Trade Commission
nor the courts have formulated a definite set of criteria by which to
determine what constitutes a line of commerce. It has been said that
there can be no certainty as to the legality of a merger, since a businessman may later learn from the Supreme Court that he is in a business of which he has never before heard.6 Experts ask whether we have
reached the "sorry state of affairs in which markets are gerrymandered
to magnify the percentages"7 of a certain market controlled by the
merging firms, in order that section 7 violations might be found.
The purpose of this note is to explore the phrase "any line of
commerce."8 It is respectfully submitted than an analysis of the
phrase in light of the legislative history of section 7 and the judicial
development of the concept of a relevant product or services market,
interpreted in the light of certain recent Supreme Court decisions,
will give some insight into the phrase "any line of commerce" and its
part in section 7 litigation.
II. TIbE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF SECTION SEVEN

Section 7 was enacted in 1914 as a part of the original Clayton Act,9
in response to the public outcry against holding companies which
were controlling many industries. 10 At that time, most corporate
acquisitions were accomplished by stock acquisitions, since exchanges
of stock could be effected without the need of large pools of capital,
and the period was characterized by the flotation of enormous amounts
of watered stock." Thus, Congress prohibited only stock acquisitions
which would substantially lessen competition or tend toward monopoly. 2
5. See, e.g., Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court v. Corporate Mergers, Fortune,
January, 1965, p. 165; Lewyn & Mann, Some Thoughts on Policy and Enforcement of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 50 A.B.A.J. 154 (1964); Oppenheim, Antitrust Booms
and Boomerangs, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 33 (1964).
6. Handler & Robinson, supra note 5, at 178.
7. Id. at 165.
8. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
9. An Act to Supplement Existing Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies,
and for Other Purposes, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The congressional reports which accompanied H.R. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), which was enacted into the Clayton
Act, were: H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) and S. RErP. No. 698,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
10. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 581-83 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958). See also MAnnN, MEancERS AND Tm CYAYTON Act 3-20 (1959); H.R. REP.
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
11. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949).
12. The original § 7 read in pertinent part: "That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of
such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation
whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or restrain
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The ineffectiveness of the statute appeared soon after it was enacted
as the courts began to interpret it very strictly,13 so that by the beginning of the forties, reports had begun to appear which warned of
increasing concentration in the American economy and the dire events5
which might result.14 In 1948, a Federal Trade Commission Report
warned that
no great stretch of the imagination is required to foresee that if nothing
is done to check the growth in concentration, either the giant corporations
will ultimately take over the country, or the government will be impelled
to step in and impose some form of direct regulation in the public interest. 10

Moreover, in 1948, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act17
had a very limited capacity in regulating mergers. 18

In response, Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Amendment 1 to
the Clayton Act in 1950, for the express purpose of limiting "future
increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions." 20 Two of the reasons for the passage
of the bill, as found by the House Committee Report, were that consuch commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any
line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914).
13. The courts interpreted § 7 so that it did not apply to asset acquisitions. FTC v.
Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v. Celanese Corp. of America,
91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The Supreme Court even went so far as to hold
that a stock acquisition was beyond the attack of § 7 if converted to an asset acquisition
any time before the issuance of the government's divestment order. Arrow-Hart &
Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934). See 16 VAND. L. RnV. 1217-19

(1963).
14. See, e.g., FTC, THE MmERE

MovE~mmr: A SummARY REPORT (1948); NA=HE AmERICAN ECONOMY (1939);
S. Doc. No. 206, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); ThE STucrTanE OF INDUsTRnY (TNEC
Monograph No. 27, 1941).
15. FTC, supra note 14.
16. Id. at 68. It is interesting to note that the authors of the 1948 FTC report on
mergers have subsequently conceded that the mergers of which they spoke have not
substantially increased economic concentration. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 232 (1960).
17. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
18. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
19. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). The legislative history of the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment in the 81st Congress is as follows: in the Senate:
S.56, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) (O'Mahoney and Kefauver); Hearings Before the
Senate judiciary on H.R. 2734, 81st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1949-50); S.REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); debate: 96 CONC. REG. 16404-05, 16433-37, 1646061, 16498-508 (1950) passed: 96 CONG. REC. 16508 (1950); in the House: H.R.
988, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949) (Jackson); 1240, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949)
(Mansfield); 2006, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949) (Hobbs); 2734, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1949) (Celler); Hearings Before the House judiciary on H.R. 2734, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); debate: 95 CoNG.
BEc. 11484-507 (1949); passed: 95 CoNG. REC. 11507 (1949); House agreed to Senate
amendments, 96 CONG. REG. 16573 (1950); approved by President on December 29,
1950, 96 CoNG. REC. 17138 (1950).
20. S.REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
TIONAL RESOURCES COMM., THE STRUCTURE oF
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centration through merger had invaded the "traditionally 'small business' industries;" 21 and that the merger movement occurring at that
time did not include smaller firms combining together to compete
on a more equal footing with larger firms, but was characterized by the
larger corporations buying out the smaller companies. 22 The amendment was designed primarily to plug the "loophole," to prohibit
asset acquisitions as well as stock acquisitions and to make the statute
applicable to vertical as well as horizontal mergers.23
There have been many detailed analyses of the legislative history of
section 7,24 but the only definite conclusion one may derive is that the
purpose of Congress, in enacting the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, was
to stop the economic concentration which was developing, and which
it considered detrimental to our "system of free enterprise."25 Section
7, as amended, was intended to prevent the concentration of economic
power by way of merger from reaching the enormity required to find
a Sherman Act violation: 26 "The intent here, as in other parts of the
Clayton Act, is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify
27
a Sherman Act proceeding."
If the effect of a merger "may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly,"28 the merger is prohibited, and the
acquiring company can be made to disgorge itself of the stock or
assets of the acquired corporation. Phrasing the statutory language
in this way burdened the courts with the duty of predicting the
future consequences of a merger on competition. Such a prediction
is so difficult that few economists feel confident that they can achieve
consistent accuracy. 29 Thus, it would appear that Congress was not
so interested in the manner in which to determine what acquisitions
would be prohibited as it was in the ultimate goal of stopping economic
concentration at its incipiency. 30
It is not essential to this discussion to consider directly the tests of
illegality which have been used by the courts in determining whether
21. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).

23. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
24. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1960); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 581-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Bok, supra
note 16, at 233-38; Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the CellerKefauver Anti-Merger Act, 61 CoLum. L. R:v. 629, 652-74 (1961); Note, 52 COLum.
L. Rav. 766 (1952). For a complete analysis of the development of § seven,
See MAETrN, MFMCERS AND
E CLAYTON AcT (1959).
25. See Bok, supra note 16, at 238.
26. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supranote 18.
27. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
28. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
29. See Bok, supranote 16, at 244-47.
30. Id. at 233-38.
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the effects of a merger are anti-competitive. Some of the primary

factors which have been applied in determining such effects are:
(1) an undue percentage share of the market, 31 (2) undue concentration in the market, 32 (3) market dominance, 33 and (4) the elimination of a significant independent company in the market.M

Such

tests, of course, must always be applied within the context of a product
or services market, and the delineation of the market will determine
the amount of concentration which has taken place. Probably the
most famous example of the relevance of market delineation is the

DuPont-Cellophanecase. 35 In an action brought under the Sherman

Act,3 6 the government charged that DuPont was monopolizing the

cellophane industry since its share of the cellophane market amounted
to seventy-five per cent.37 DuPont successfully defended, however, by
arguing that the market had been ill-defined by the government.

DuPont contended that cellophane was not a market in itself, but
only part of the flexible packaging market of which DuPont's cello-

phane production accounted for less than twenty per cent. 38 If the
market had been held to be just cellophane, DuPont would surely have
a monopoly, while if it were defined as all flexible packaging material,
DuPont's share of the market would not reach monopoly proportions.
31. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), 16 VAND. L. REV. 1217
(1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
32. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 31; A. C. Spalding &
Co. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1962); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. American
Cuban Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960),
33. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 31; Crown Zellerbach Corp.
v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961); Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., TnAn.
REG. REP. fr70674, at f[ 78085 (S.D. Calif. Feb. 13, 1963).
34. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 31; Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, supra note 31; A. G. Spalding & Co. v. FTC, supra note 32; Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, supra note 33; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra
note 32; Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., supra note 33; Pillsbury Mills, Inc., supra
note 32. The House Report accompanying the Celler-Kefauver Amendment expressed
these factors in other terms: "Such an [anticompetitive] effect may arise in various
ways: such as elimination in whole or in material part of the competitive activity of
an enterprise which has been a substantial factor in competition, increase in the relative
size of the enterprise making the acquisition to such a point that its advantage over
its competitors threatens to be decisive, undue reduction in the number of competing
enterprises, or establishment of relationships between buyers and sellers which deprive
their rivals of a fair opportunity to compete." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1949). For a detailed analysis of these and other factors used by the courts
in determining the illegality of a merger, see Bocx, MEaRCns AND MA

(3d ed. 1964).
35. United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
36. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
37. United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra note 35, at 379.
38. Ibid.
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III. LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF "ANY LnE OF CoMnI,=cle

There is no indication that the phrase "any line of commerce" in
the original Clayton Act 39 expressed any concept more definite than a
vague notion of a line of trade or a product market.40
The phrase originally only modified the words, "tend to create a
monopoly," but in the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, it was reworded
so that the relevant product or services market must be delineated in
applying both tests of illegality, the lessening of competition and
the tendency to create a monopoly.4 ' A congressional report on the
Celler-Kefauver bilP4 stated:
It is intended that acquisitions which substantially lessen competition, as

well as those which tend to create monopoly, will be unlawful if they have
the specified effect in any line of commerce, whether or not that line of

commerce is a large part of the business of any of the corporations involved
43
in the acquisition.

"Line of commerce," suggested the report, is defined in terms of the
relevant area of effective competition," the determination of which
can only be made through an economic analysis of the factual situation in which the merger occurs.4 5 In amending section 7, therefore,
Congress indicated that the Federal Trade Commission and the courts
in the future would have to base their investigations on a market,
in the economic sense, and that the effects on competition would
have to be measured within a relevant product or services market.46
Beyond that, however, Congress gave no indication as to the manner
in which the relevant product or services market, the line of commerce, was to be determined.
39. "An Act to Supplement Existing Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Mono-

polies, and for Other Purposes," 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The phrase "in any line of
commerce" is found in §§ 2, 3, & 7.
40. The phrase "or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce" was added
to § 7 in conference without any mention of "any line of commerce," but because it
was feared that an acquisition might not lessen competition, yet it might tend to
create a monopoly or a restraint of trade. Remarks of Senator Chilton, 51 CONG. REC.
16002 (1914). See United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. 586,
591-92 (1957).
41. See MARTm, op. cit. supra note 24, at 259, 264.
42. H.R. 2734, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
43. S.REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
44. S.REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
45. See Markham, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Economics, 64 CoLum.
L. REv. 405, 408 (1964).
46. See MmATnN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 265.
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JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPT OF RELEVANT PRODUCT OR

SERVICES MARKET OR LINE OF COMMERCE

The judicial notion of a line of commerce or a product or services
market was slow in developing. In the earliest section 7 cases, no
consideration whatsoever was given to such a definition. 7 Not until
1929, in the Van Camp case, 48 an action brought under section 2 of
the Clayton Act,49 was there any reference made to the concept. The
Court did not enunciate any factors to be considered in defining a
relevant product or services market, but it did give some indication
as to the breadth of the phrase; "the phrase is comprehensive and
means that if the forbidden effect or tendency is produced in one out
of all of the various lines of commerce, the words 'in any line of
commerce' literally are satisfied." 0 As a result of this case, it was soon
accepted that the product or services market as defined for purposes of
the Clayton Act, and specifically section 7, need not be the main line
or lines of commerce in which merging firms are engaged, but that
it may be "any" line of business affected by the merger.5
International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission52 was one
of the few Commission decisions under the original section 7 which
was reviewed by the Supreme Court. In that case, International
Shoe had acquired the stock of the McElwain Company, another shoe
manufacturer. The Court held that the two shoe companies were not
competing within the same line of commerce. International Shoe
sold primarily a work shoe while McElwain marketed a dress shoe.
The Court, in delineating two separate "lines of commerce," emphasized the distinct customers to which the shoes of the two different
companies appealed as a result of the difference in quality and price:
It is plain .

.

. that the product of the two companies here in question,

because of the difference in appearance and workmanship, appealed to the
tastes of entirely different classes of consumers; that while a portion of

the product of both companies went into the same states, in the main the
product of each was sold to a 53different class of dealers and found its way
into distinctly separate markets.

In 1948, the Supreme Court handed down the Columbia Steel Co.
47. See Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923); FTC v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 6 F.T.C. 213 (1923). For
a discussion of these cases, see MARirr, op. cit. supra note 24, at 58-73. But cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
48. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
49. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
50. 278 U.S. at 254.
51. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
52. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
53. Id. at 296-97.
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decision, 4 in which it explored the concept of a relevant product or
services market, this time under the Sherman Act.5 5 The Court was
faced with the problem of whether "plates and shapes," certain un56
finished steel products made from ingots by means of rolling mills,
constituted a market distinct from other rolled steel products.5 7 In
holding that all rolled steel products are part of the same market,
the Court applied a test of interchangeability of production: "If rolled
steel producers can make other products as easily as plates and shapes,
then the removal of Consolidated's demand for plates and shapes
must be measured not against the market for plates and shapes
alone, but for all comparable rolled products." 58
Therefore, as of the time of the passage of the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment, the Supreme Court had suggested two tests that could
be applied in determining a relevant product or services market: a
distinct customers test, determined by such factors as quality and
price; 59 and an interchangeability of production test which delineated
a market to include all products which could be produced interchangeably. 60
By 1954 the rising importance of delineating the relevant product
market in antitrust suits was evidenced by the opinion of Judge
61
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
an action under the Sherman Act, 62 asserting that United had a
monopoly in the shoe machinery industry. The court looked to the
factual situation, analyzing it with the manifest intention of defining
the market which actually existed in the shoe machinery business.
In a section of his opinion,63 Judge Wyzanski held that the relevant
market was composed of all shoe machinery except dry thread
machinery. 64 "[R]egardless of the relationship of a particular machine
type to another type or to a particular process, they are in the same
market, because all processes are in competition with one another." 65
54. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
55. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
56. 334 U.S. at 499.
57. For an explanation of the distinction between "plates and shapes" and other
rolled steel products, see 334 U.S. at 499-500.
58. Id. at 510.
59. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
60. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra note 18.
61. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Mass. 1953).
62. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
63. 110 F. Supp. at 302-03.
64. United did not manufacture sewing and stitching machinery. The evidence
showed that other manufacturers of shoe machinery did not make sewing machinery and
that manufacturers of sewing machinery did not manufacture other shoe machinery.
"Sewing machinery, unlike other shoe machinery, is used in many industries other than
shoe manufacture, and its manufacture does not require detailed knowledge of the
whole art of shoe making." Id: at .303.
7
65. Id. at 302.
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Each shoe manufacturer, he said, is aiming at the consumer dollar
spent on shoes; thus, the processes and machines of one manufacturer
are competing with those of every other manufacturer. By offering
all machine types except dry thread sewing machines, United, the
most important producer in the field, aids in defining the shoe
machinery market, since "defining a market turns on discovering
patterns of trade which are followed in practice." 66
In 1962, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment was first judicially inter67
preted by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.
The two most important cases in developing the pre-Brown Shoe con68
cept of a relevant product or services market were the DuPont cases.70
69
In the first case, a civil action under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
the government charged that DuPont had monopolized interstate
commerce in cellophane, since DuPont produced almost seventy-five
per cent of the cellophane sold in the United States. 7' The relevant
product market in which to judge DuPont's activity emerged as the
determinative issue, for cellophane constituted less than twenty per
cent of a broader market encompassing all flexible packaging material
sales.72 The Court said that if alternative products exist that buyers
may use for the same purpose, control of the product allegedly monopolized will not be an illegal monopoly. 73 In holding that the market
consisted of all flexible packaging material,74 the Court then applied
a test of reasonable interchangeability. "Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on how different from one
another are the offered commodities in character or use, how far
buyers will go to substitute one commodity for another."75 The Court
equated this test with the economic concept of cross-elasticity of
demand 76 between products, which is the responsiveness of the sales
66. Id. at 303.

67. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 31, was the first Supreme Court
case to interpret the Celler-Kefauver Amendment and, therefore, is one of the most
important precedents in this area of the law.
68. United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957)
(hereinafter cited as DuPont-General Motors; United States v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (hereinafter cited as Dupont-Cellophane).
69. DuPont-Cellophane, supranote 68.
70. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
71. 351 U.S. at 379.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 394.
74. Id. at 404.
75. Id. at 383.
76. One noted antitrust economist has defined the concept as follows: "Crosselasticity reflects the extent to which price changes in one product affect the amount
of another product that buyers will buy. Where the cross-elasticity of demand for
rival products is great, a decline in the price of one decreases the sale of the other
and may lead to a decline in its price." STocmnso, WomALrx ComzrrxoN Am
AN-rrusT Pouacy 123 (1961).
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of one product to the price changes of another. 77 "Thus, if a slight
decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of
customers of other flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane, it would
be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand 78exists between
them; that the products compete in the same market."
It was suggested by one commentator shortly after the cellophane
decision that section 7 of the Clayton Act would require a test other
than reasonable interchangeability in defining a relevant product
market, since the Clayton Act requires less of a showing of probable
harm than does the Sherman Act.79 However, the courts have applied
the interchangeability of use test in many later section 7 cases, and
it stands at the present time as the primary test used to determine a
product market under section 7.80
The second DuPontcase 8l was an old section 7 case seeking to divest
DuPont of the twenty-three per cent of General Motors stock which
it had owned for more than thirty years.8 2 In this case, the Court
held for the first time that
determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of

a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be
one which will substantially lessen competition "within the area of effective

competition." Substantiality can be determined only in terms of the market
83
affected.

The controversy centered on whether DuPont's stock ownership was
the cause of General Motors' purchasing a large part of its supply
of automotive finishes and fabrics from DuPont, thereby substantially
lessening competition in that market. In holding that automotive
finishes and fabrics were a relevant market apart from all finishes and'
fabrics, the Court applied a test of "sufficiently peculiar characteristics
and use."
77. 351 U.S. at 400. For a criticism of this test, see Mann & Lewyn, The Relevant
Market under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-Two Different Views,
47 VA. L. REv. 1014 (1961).
78. 351 U.S. at 400.
79. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HAav. L. REv. 281, 315

(1056).

80. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
81. DuPont-General Motors, supra note 65.
82. Between 1917 and 1919, DuPont purchased 23% of the outstanding stock of
General Motors for a total outlay of $49 million. Since this action was not brought by
the Justice Department until 1949, the Supreme Court decision handed down in 1957,
acted retroactively to void a stock acquisition which had occurred almost forty years
before. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the substantial lessening of
competition was the result, not of the stock acquisition, but of the internal growth
of both corporations subsequent to the acquisition. If the latter was true, then § 7
was not a proper statute under which to order divestiture.
83. 353 U.S. at 593.
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The record shows that automotive finishes and fabrics have sufficiently
peculiar characteristics and use to constitute them products sufficiently
make them a 'line of comdistinct from all other finishes and fabrics to
84
merce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act.

Since General Motors was the largest automobile manufacturer in the

United States and, therefore, the largest purchaser of automotive
finishes and fabrics, and since General Motors purchased more than

half of its requirements from DuPont subsequent to the stock acquisition, the Court found a substantial lessening of competition violative
of section 7 in the line of commerce of automotive finishes and fabrics.
Until the Brown Shoe decision85 was handed down in 1962, the

lower courts based their determination of a relevant product and
services market under the Celler-Kefauver Amendment on these Sherman Act cases or on the cases brought under the old section 7. Only
after twelve years of interpretation by the district courts and the
Federal Trade Commission did the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe set
any guidelines for the delineation of a "line of commerce" under the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment.8 6

V. DEvELoPmENT OF "ANY LiNE OF COMMERCE" UNDER THE
CELLER-KEFAUVER AMENDMENT
Although the phrase "any line of commerce" was included in the
original Clayton Act,8 7 the importance of delineating a relevant market
has increased since the passage of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment.88
In analyzing a transaction so complex as a merger in order to demarcate a relevant market in which the merger might have anti-competitive effect, great use has been made of economic concepts and
theory.8 9 Although these concepts are useful in identifying the product
dimensions of a market, the determination of a line of commerce is not
the result of an abstract economic analysis alone. The economic concepts and theories become legal concepts and theories as defined by
the courts and must be analyzed in their legal sense, even though they
84. Id. at 593-94.
85. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 80.
86. See note 117 infra and accompanying text.
87. An Act to Supplement Existing Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies,
and for Other Purposes, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
88. See Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 629, 642 (1961). See also note 83 supra.
89. "Section 7 of the Clayton Act is stated in such terms that adjudication of merger
cases is virtually impossible until a reasonable amount of economic analysis is in the
record. As historians, lawyers, and economists have frequently pointed out, in enacting section § 7 Congress was unable, because of the market complexities of the business
world, to specify in precise and measurable terms which mergers were permitted and
which were prohibited." Markham, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Economics,
64 CoLU . L. REv. 405, 408 (1964).
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originated in the field of economics. 90 Consequently, a conclusion based
on the most accurate economic analysis may well be contrary to a legal
conclusion concerning the same facts. In section 7 litigation, the
congressional intent to thwart the concentration of economic power
at its incipiency pervades the entire analysis, including the determination of the "line of commerce" and is paramount to contrary economic
conclusions.
The consequence of this blending of economics and law is uncertainty.91 No general formula or rule has been enunciated which will
delineate in all cases the relevant product or services market. A factor
determinative in one case may not be present in another, or if it is,
will not be of the same significance. Only by a complete economic
analysis of the factual situation in the light of the purpose of section 7
can the boundaries of a market be defined. This does not mean,
however, that there is no way to predict the legality of a proposed
merger. The general principles and specific tests which have been
enunciated by the courts afford business fairly reasonable guidelines to use in predicting the general line of commerce, if any, in
which it could be held that there is a reasonable probability that a
proposed merger might have the effect of substantially lessening
competition or tending toward monopoly. 92 Uncertainty could be
reduced by the enunciation of per se tests of illegality as has been
done for certain practices under other antitrust statutes; but accuracy
of decision would surely be sacrificed, for mergers have not yet been
sufficiently explored for the courts or the Commission to have a full
93
understanding of the prospective economic manifestations.
An analysis of the judicial interpretation of "any line of commerce'
since passage of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment will show: (1) the
"lego-economic method" 94 used by the courts in demarcating the line
of commerce in which to analyze the effects on competition; (2) the
factors deemed by the courts to be important or determinative in
defining a line of commerce in a particular case; and (3) the general
90. See BocK, MERGERS AND MAmn-rs (3d ed. 1964).
91. Id. at 83; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and

Economics, 74 Hnv. L. REv. 226 (1960).
92. See BOCK, op. cit. supra note 90, at 4.
93. In White Motor Co. v. United States, the Court held that it would not determine
vertical territorial limitations to be illegal per se for the following reason: "Horizontal
territorial limitations, like '[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal
with other traders,' . . . are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling
of competition. A vertical territorial limitation may or may not have that purpose or

effect. We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to be certain." 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
94. By the use of the term 'lego-economic method," the author intends to imply a
blending of economics and law in which economic concepts and theories are utilized,
but in which the courts are not bound to any definitional rigidity of the economic
discipline.
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principles and guidelines expressed by the courts for defining a line
of commerce.
Although the cases decided under the Celler-Kefauver Amendment
prior to Brown Shoe9 5 were confusing and conflicting, they did establish certain patterns in section 7 litigation. These decisions so fortified
the proposition that the relevant product or services market must be
delineated in a section 7 case 96 that in DuPont-GeneralMotors, 7 the
Supreme Court could easily hold that such a delineation is a prerequisite to measuring the anti-competitive effects of a merger.9 Moreover, the reasoning of the Van Camp case, 99 that "any line of commerce" was sufficiently comprehensive to mean any one of several lines
of commerce possibly affected, 100 has persisted and become stronger:
"Any line of commerce does not mean the same as the entire line
of commerce, or all lines of commerce engaged in or touched upon by
the acquired concern. The line of commerce need not even be a large
part of the business of any of the corporations involved."' 01
Since the two DuPont cases,102 the tests laid down by the Supreme
Court in those cases-interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of
demand 10 3 and sufficiently peculiar characteristics and use' 0 4-have
been applied as the general tests by which to determine the relevant
product market in a section 7 case. 0 5
On the other hand, the courts and the Commission also have developed more specific tests before a section 7 action was argued
before the Supreme Court. One of the primary tests developed was
a "market recognition" test. If the particular product area alleged to
be a proper line of commerce is recognized as a distinct industry or
product market, by either the industry itself, exemplified by trade
associations for example, or by the public, then it may be said that
such a market has sufficiently peculiar characteristics and use under
95. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 80.
96. See text accompanying note 68-86 supra.
97. Supra note 68.
98. DuPont-General Motors, supra note 68, at 593.
99. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
100. Id. at 253.
101. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 812 (9th Cir. 1961).
102. DuPont-General Motors, supra note 68; DuPont-Cellophane, supra note 68.
103. DuPont-Cellophane, supra note 68, at 395.
104. DuPont-General Motors, supra note 63, at 593-94.
105. For cases applying the peculiar characteristics and uses standard, see, e.g.,
A. G. Spalding & Co. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 602 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Union Carbide Corp.,
59 F.T.C. 614, 627 (1961). For cases applying the interchangeability of use standard,
see, e.g., American Crystal Sugar Co. v. American Cuban Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1958).
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the Dupont-GeneralMotors test1 °6 to be a separate line of commerce. 10 7
In Bethlehem Steel,10 8 the court concluded that the iron and steel
industry had sufficiently peculiar characteristics and use to be considered a line of commerce:
The products of the iron and steel industry are generally distinct one
from the other and as a group distinct from the products of other industries.
They are sold in a recognized market with its own competitive standards.
The iron and steel industry is commonly recognized by its members as
well as the community at large as a separate industry. It has its own trade
association, treating the industry as separate and distinct. In light of these
facts the conclusion is warranted that the sum of all the products of the
10 9
iron and steel industry constitute a line of commerce.

Another test developed is the "distinct customers" test. If an alleged
product market has an identifiable set of buyers for its product or
service, distinct customers which either use or resell the product or
service, then it is more likely that the alleged product market will
be a proper line of commerce. 110 For example, in the Spalding case,"'
the court found two distinct lines of commerce within the more
general line of commerce of sporting goods: sporting goods to be
112
used in competitive sport, and sporting goods which were toys.
These products were of different quality and for different purposes
and thus sold to distinct customers. The better goods were sold to
professional and amateur athletic teams while the toys were sold to
or for use by children.
Another test applied to establish sufficiently peculiar characteristics
between the two proposed lines of commerce was the "distinct
prices" of each." 3 The lower quality goods produced to be used as
toys were much lower priced than were the goods manufactured to
be used in competitive contests.
The courts, therefore, developed three new tests to be used in determiing the presence of sufficiently peculiar characteristics and use
and interchangeability of use: public or industry recognition, distinct
customers, and distinct prices.
One of the most important determinations of the lower courts and
the Commission was the realistic delineation of a relevant product
or services market; it must conform to the actual competitive situation
106. DuPont-General Motors, supra note 68, at 593-94.
107. See, e.g., A. G. Spalding & Co. v. FTC, supra note 105, at 602.
108. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 105.
109. Id. at 594.
110. See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, supra note 101; United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 105.
111. A. G. Spalding & Co. v. FTC, supra note 105.
112. Id. at 601.
113. Id. at 602, See also In the Matter of Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614
(1961).
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involved in the particular case. In the Crown Zellerbach decision, n4
a case involving review of a Federal Trade Commission ruling, the
Ninth Circuit held that what was important in determining the line
of commerce were the "facts concerning competition in the market."'
"All that the Commission was required to do was to ascertain and
find a product line which was sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in
terms of trade realities.""6 These trade realities, however, must be
considered in light of the purpose of section 7: to stop concentration
of economic power at its incipiency.
The Supreme Court considered the Celler-Kefauver Amendment for
the first time in 1962, in the now famous Brown Shoe decision.117 This
opinion introduced the concept of "submarkets" as distinguished from
"markets." The Court said that since section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits a merger which has anti-competitive effects in "any line
of commerce," the effects of the merger must*be examined in every
"economically significant submarket" to determine whether it might
have anti-competitive effects in that market. 118
In asserting the importance of "economically significant sub2
markets,"" 9 the Court adopted the requirement of Crown Zellerbach11
of commerce must be
that any market which qualifies as a line
meaningful in terms of trade realities." 121 However, the Court expanded the concept of the relevant product or services market by
saying that there can be markets within markets which are economically significant.'22
In defining the outer boundaries of a product market, the Court
applied the DuPont Cellophane'23 test of "reasonable interchangeability of use" which it equated with "cross-elasticity of demand between
the product itself and substitutes for it."124 The Court thus applied
12
the same test used to delineate a market under the Sherman Act.
The Court went on, however, to say that within this broader
market there can be well defined submarkets which, for the purpose
114. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, supra note 101.
115. Id. at 807.
116. Id. at 811. (Emphasis added.)
117. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 80.
118. Id. at 325.
119. Ibid.
120. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, supra note 101.
121. Id. at 811.
122. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 80, at 325. See A. G. Spalding
& Co. v. FTC, supra note 105.
123. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
124. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 80, at 325.
125. In a footnote, the Court suggested that interchangeability of production
facilities, the test applied in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495
(1948), may also be used to delineate a broad product market under § 7. Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 80, at 325 n.42.
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of section 7, qualify as lines of commerce. The Court listed "practical
indicia" which it said could be used in determining a submarket:
industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic

entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct customers,
distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and
126

specialized vendors.

These indicia were an enumeration of the different factors and tests
used by the lower courts and the Commission in determination of a
"line of commerce." 127 The Court did not state that these six were
the indicia to be applied, but it said only that indicia such as these
might be applied to make it easier to analyze the actual market
situation, to determine what markets are "economically significant." 12
These indicia were subsequently used in the analysis of the market
in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,1 29 in which
converting aluminum foil for use by the florist trade was held to be a
line of commerce. 30 It was said:
It is now clear that the mere potential interchangeability or cross-elasticity
may be insufficient to mark the legally pertinent limits of a "relevant line
of commerce." The "outer limits" of a general market may be thus deter-

mined, but sharply distinct submarkets can exist within these outer limits
which may hence forth be the focal point of administrative and judicial
inquiry under section 7.131
The court held that the Commission had properly defined the
"relevant line of commerce" by the use of three of the indicia
enumerated in Brown Shoe: public and industrial recognition of the
market as a separate economic entity, its distinct customers, and its
132
distinct prices.
In the PhiladelphiaNational Bank case,13 the Court again stressed
the importance of determining a line of commerce in accord with
"trade realities." 134 The Court found commercial banking to be a line
of commerce. Certain products or services of a bank have little or no
competition; other services enjoy a cost advantage over any competition, and finally some services enjoy a settled consumer preference
126. Ibid.
127. The Court, in enumerating these indicia, cited BocK, MEanERs AND M.uuExrs,
AN EcoNozuc ANALYSIS OF CASE LAw 25-35 (1960). Id. at 325 n.43. In Miss Bock's
book, the same enumeration will be found as the list of factors, with analysis, which
lower courts had emphasized in prior § 7 cases.
128. Ibid.
129. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
130. Id. at 228.
131. Id. at 226.
132. Id. at 227.
133. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
134. Id. at 357.
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over any competitors.135 For these reasons the Court found a low
cross-elasticity of demand between commercial banking and competitors such as savings and loan associations; and the Court, therefore,
held commercial banking to be a line of commerce for purposes of
section 7.

VI. ECENT CASES
Two 1964 Supreme Court cases interpreting section seven and the
phrase "any line of commerce" gave answers to some of the problems
which had arisen as to how to delineate a relevant product market. 3 '
A. Continental Can
In United States v. Continental Can Co.,' 7 the Justice Department

brought an action under section 7 for a divestiture order. Continental,
engaged principally in the manufacture and sale of metal cans and
other metal containers, had acquired all of the assets and assumed
all of the liabilities of Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, a company engaged
in the business of manufacturing and selling glass containers.
In addition to metal containers, Continental also manufactured can
closing machinery, flexible packaging, plastic containers and other
plastic products, paper containers and other paper products, certain
can, bottle and jar tops and caps, and a miscellany of other products.'38
Hazel-Atlas produced glass containers of various types for industrial
consumers and glass jars for home canning, both largely of the
wide-mouth variety. 139 It also manufactured certain glass containers
for the home, some specially designed glass articles for industrial
use, and screw-type metal lids for glass jars. At the time of the
merger, the two merging companies manufactured no identical
products. 140
In 1955, the year before the merger, Continental was the second
largest company in the metal container field, manufacturing approximately thirty-three per cent of the metal containers sold in the
United States. Continental and American Can, the largest producer,
shipped seventy-one per cent of all the metal containers, with the
number three company shipping only about five per cent. 141 In 1955,
Hazel-Atlas was third in glass container shipments with a little less
135. Id. at 356-57.
136. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
137. Supra note 136.
138. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
139. Id. at 770.
140. ibid.
141. 378 U.S. at 445.
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than ten per cent, while the first two glass container manufacturers
accounted for about forty-six per cent of the glass container shipments. 14 Therefore, these two product markets, metal containers and
glass containers, the only two agreed upon by the parties as relevant
product markets for the purpose of section 7, were both highly concentrated. Concentration has always been a primary factor in determining the illegality of an acquisition under section 7.143
At the trial, the government sought to prove ten lines of commerce,144 including the two above. It then endeavored to prove that
the merger caused a reasonable probability of anti-competitive effects
in each market delineated. At the close of the government's case, the
defendant moved for dismissal, 145 on the ground that upon the law and
the facts no right of relief had been shown by the government.
The lower court found that only three of the proposed product
markets qualified as constituting a line of commerce for the purpose
of section 7: metal containers and glass containers, the two product
markets stipulated, and containers for the beer industry. 146 In these
three lines of commerce, the court found no showing of a reasonable
probability of anti-competitive effects; therefore, it dismissed the
47
action.1
In analyzing the market situation, the trial court classified the
products which Continental and Hazel-Atlas manufactured into three
separate industries: metal containers, plastic containers, and glass
containers;1 48 and the court analyzed the difference between each of
these in terms of some of the "practical indicia" laid down in Brown
Shoe: the distinct physical characteristics, the trade associations in
each industry recognizing it as an industry, and the different
machinery required for the manufacture of each product line. 149 The
court did, however, recognize "substantial and vigorous inter-industry
competition between these three industries,"' 50 and that "Hazel-Atlas
and Continental were part of this overall industrial pattern, each in
a recognized separate industry producing distinct products engaged
in inter-industry competition for the favor of various end users of
142. Id. at 446.
143. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, supra note 133, at 362-70.
144. "The ten lines of commerce are as follows: 1. The packaging industry. 2. The
can industry. 3. The glass container industry. 4. Metal closures. 5. Containers for
the beer industry. 6. Containers for the soft drink industry. 7. Containers for the
canning industry. 8. Containers for the toiletries and cosmetic industry. 9. Containers
for the medicine and health industry. 10. Containers for the household and chemical
industry." 217 F. Supp. at 778-79.
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
146. 217 F. Supp. at 806.
147. Id. at 806-07.
148. Id. at 770-71.
149. Id. at 771-76.
150. Id. at 780.
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their products." 151 The court held that these three industries, metal
containers, glass containers, and plastic containers, could not be
included in a single product market because they produced a wide
variety of products and there was no showing of a reasonable interchangeability
of use or a cross-elasticity of demand between these
52
products.1
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, 153 the government advocated a line of commerce which it had not suggested on the trial level:
"the production and sale of containers for all end uses for which
metal and glass containers compete." 154 The government argued that
section 7 was enacted not only to prohibit concentration within an
industry, but also to prohibit inter-industry concentration when the
industries vigorously compete as do the metal container and the glass
container industries. A merger between dominant firms in two competing industries, eliminating substantial inter-industry competition,
"can be a significant step toward increasing concentration by maintaining and extending oligopoly structure"15 and should be proscribed
by section 7.156
Continental accepted the contention that inter-industry competition
could be proscribed by section 7 in the proper factual situation, but it
contended that the facts in this case did not show a proper line of
commerce encompassing both metal and glass containers. 157 It argued
that the evidence did not show reasonable interchangeability of use
or cross-elasticity of demand. 5 8 In addition, Continental contended
that application of the "practical indicia" enumerated in Brown Shoe
does not support a line of commerce composed of metal and glass
containers. First, the can industry and the glass container industry
are separate and well defined, each having its own trade association
and being recognized by the business world as a separate industry
and market. Secondly, cans and glass containers are made of different material and have different physical characteristics. Moreover,
can and glass container manufacturing equipment is not interchangeable. In addition, there was no evidence to show that purchasers of metal cans or glass containers, or both, fall into any categories of distinct classes of customers. Glass containers and cans are
priced separately, the price of the latter being determined primarily
151.
152.
153.
154.
136.

Id. at 781.
Ibid.
62 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
Brief for Appellant, p. 14, United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note

155. Id. at 21.

156. Ibid.
157. Brief for Appellee, p. 11, United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 136.
158. Id. at 12-16.
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by that of tinplate and the price of the former by that of labor.
Also, the prices of one type of container are not changed by price
movements of the other type. There are no specialized vendors; the
manufacturers sell their respective products. 159 Finally, in addition
to the tests enumerated in Brown Shoe, Continental argued that,
even according to the government's own evidence, there is little actual
competition between glass and metal containers; on the contrary,
either one type of container or the other is used for the packaging of
specific goods and there is little interchangeability. 16
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the inter-industry competition between glass and metal containers is sufficient to warrant
treating as a relevant product market the combined glass and metal
container industries and all end uses for which they compete."' 6 '
The Court said that there is no precise formula with which to determine the relevant product market, but that such a judgment must
be based on consideration of the entire record to recognize meaningful
competition when it in fact exists. 62 It recognized the differences
between glass and metal containers and their use but said these
factors should not "obscure the competitive relationships which this
record so compellingly reveals." 163 After analyzing some of the areas
in which glass and metal containers compete, the Court found that
the competition between the two industries was "insistent, continuous,
effective and quantitywise very substantial."164 A narrow construction
of "competition" and of "reasonable interchangeability of use and
cross-elasticity of demand" cannot be "used to obscure competition
but to 'recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists.' "165
Even though the interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand is not immediate, the long run competition between glass and
metal containers, caused, for example, by innovation, brings the
competition within the proscriptions of section 7.166
Since the purpose of delineating a line of commerce is to provide an

adequate basis for measuring the effects of a given acquisition, its contours
must, as nearly as possible, conform to competitive reality. Where the area
of effective competition cuts across industry lines, so must the relevant line
of commerce, otherwise an adequate determination of the merger's true
167
impact cannot be made.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 17-19.
Id. at 21-31.
378 U.S. at 457.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 452-53, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326

(1962).
166. 378 U.S. at 455.
167. Id. at 457.
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In analyzing the effects of the merger in this line of commerce, the
Court found a probable lessening of competition as a result of the
merger. The Court applied the "principle that where there has been
a 'history of tendency toward concentration in the industry,' tendencies
toward further concentration 'are to be curbed in their incipiency.' "18
Although Continental and Hazel-Atlas were not actually competing
for the same market, they had the potential to do so. Therefore,
since this potential to compete existed, and since the container industry had been heading toward heavy concentration, such a merger
was struck down as a violation of section 7.169
The Court in Continental Can re-emphasized the importance of the
purpose of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7 litigation.
Both the glass container industry and the metal container industry
are highly concentrated; since section 7 seeks to impede economic
concentration at its incipiency,1 70 the purpose of the statute is properly
fulfilled by prohibiting such a merger. With this purpose in mind,
the Court delineated a line of commerce which must be questioned
as to its economic significance.171
Of some import is the fact that the Court did not consider use of
the "practical indicia" of Brown Shoe to be mandatory. As a result
of this decision, it is apparent that such indicia will be used to divide
a line of commerce into smaller lines of commerce only when it is
necessary to do so in order to more readily find the requisite anticompetitive effect. If the proscribed effect can be found in a larger
line of commerce, however, as it was in this case, the Court need not
analyze any submarkets. Such an approach is in accord with the holding in the Van Camp case172 that if the requisite illegal effect is found
in any line of commerce, it is a violation of the Clayton Act.
The Court appears to approach the definition of a line of commerce
in Continental Can with so great a degree of emphasis on the purpose
of finding a market in which the anti-competitive effects are substantial that the usefulness of the concept of a line of commerce is lost.
When Congress suggested that a line of commerce should be econo*mically significant, 73 it would seem that the intent was to demarcate
any actual area of competition in which the competitive effects of
the acquisition might be accurately analyzed so that the Court could
reach a realistic decision as to the effect of the acquisition on competi168. Id. at 461.

169. Ibid.

170. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
171. See Comment, 1964 Developments in the Application of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act to Horizontal Acquisitions, 33 FoRIHA L. REv. 274, 287-95 (1964); The
Supreme Court,1963 Term, 78 HAzv.L. REv. 143, 269-75 (1964).
172. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
173. S.REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
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tion. In Continental Can, however, it appears that the Court determined that a merger between leading firms in related industries which
are highly concentrated is per se illegal; and then the Court delineated
a line of commerce in which to identify the illegal effects, as required
by the statute. 74
Moreover, the Court, although it recognized that plastic is in vigorous competition with glass and metal containers, does not include
plastic containers in the line of commerce delineated. Plastic surely
competes for many of the same end uses as glass and metal containers
and may well gain a competitive advantage in the near future as a
result of the technological advancements which are being made in
that industry. Therefore, it would appear that the Court, in properly
considering the purposes of section 7, has so overemphasized the
importance of that purpose that it "reads the 'line of commerce'
element out of section 7, and destroys its usefulness as an aid to
analysis." 7 5
B. Alcoa
In the second recent case, United States v. Aluminum Company of
America 7 6 the United States brought an action charging violation of
section 7 against Alcoa, seeking divestiture of the assets of the Rome
Cable Corporation, which Alcoa had acquired through merger.
Alcoa is a completely integrated producer of aluminum and aluminum products. Until World War II, it maintained a monopoly in
the American aluminum market. 7 7 However, as a result of post-war
governmental policies fostering competition, other firms entered the
integrated aluminum industry. 78 As of 1960, nevertheless, Alcoa was
still the largest producer of primary aluminum. 7 9 Among the wide
variety of aluminum products which Alcoa produces are aluminum
conductor wire and cable and insulated or covered aluminum wire and
cable. These products are designed to be used commercially in the
transmission of electricity. Copper wire and cable is the only other
product used commercially for such purposes.' 8° Bare aluminum
conductor is now used for most overhead transmission lines, while
174. See 378 U.S. at 476-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 468.
176. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
177. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 422-24, 438 (2d
Cir. 1945).
178. Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra
note 177; Brief for Apellee, pp. 4-5, id.
179. Primary aluminum is the plain aluminum ingot after being refined from the
bauxite, as opposed to finished products made from aluminum, e.g., aluminum conductor.
In 1960, Alcoa produced 38%of the primary aluminum in the United States. Brief for
Appellant, p. 4, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 177.
180. 377 U.S. at 273.
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both bare and insulated conductor, aluminum and copper, are used
in distribution lines. Insulated copper conductor, however, is the
only conductor used in underground lines. In 1958, the last year
prior to the merger, Alcoa produced no copper conductor, but produced 32.3% of the bare aluminum conductor, 11.6% of the insulated
aluminum conductor, and 27.8% of the broader aluminum line. 8'
Alcoa was the leading producer of the broad aluminum conductor line
third in the producand of the bare aluminum conductor and ranked
82
tion of the insulated aluminum conductor.
Rome Cable Corporation was a fabricator of copper and aluminum
wire and cable products. Rome's primary production was in copper
wire and cable; but, in addition, in 1958, the year prior to the
merger, it produced 0.3% of the bare aluminum conductor produced
in the United States, 4.7% of the insulated aluminum conductor and
1.3% of the broader aluminum line.1 As a result, the government
sought to prove anti-competitive effects in the broader aluminum
conductor line.
At the trial level, three lines of commerce were stipulated: the
broad conductor wire and cable market, encompassing both copper
and aluminum, the insulated wire and cable market, both copper and
aluminum, and the bare aluminum cable line.84 The primary issue
concerned whether aluminum conductor line, both bare and insulated, and insulated aluminum conductor line constitute lines of
commerce for the purposes of section 7.
In rejecting insulated aluminum conductor as a line of commerce,
the district court applied the indicia enumerated by the Supreme
Court in Brown Shoe. The court found that insulated aluminum
conductor was not recognized in the industry as a separate economic
entity; that it was functionally interchangeable with copper; that
production facilities for both aluminum and copper were interchangeable; that the insulated aluminum conductor had no customers distinct from insulated copper conductor purchasers; and that there were
no specialized vendors. 85 The court did recognize, however, that
there were price distinctions between the aluminum and the copper
cable and that there was no price sensitivity between the two
products. 18
Since insulated aluminum conductor did not constitute a line of
181. Id. at 274.
182. Id. at 278.
183. Id. at 273-74.
184. A fourth line of commerce, not important for this discussion, was stipulated:
conduit (aluminum and steel). United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F.
Supp. 501, 509 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid.
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commerce, the broader aluminum conductor line could not be considered a line of commerce, the court said. For a line of commerce
cannot consist of two parts, one of which is a line of commerce and
one of which is not. "To constitute a proper line of commerce,
same must include the substitutes therefor which are reasonably interchangeable in use and for which there is a cross-elasticity of demand." 8 7 The court then went on to hold that in the lines of com-

merce proved, there was no showing of a reasonable probability of
a substantial lessening of competition or a tendency toward mono188
poly.

On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 89 the government argued that the district court erred in its findings as to the
relevant lines of commerce and that the proper product markets in
which to measure the effect of the merger were the insulated aluminum conductor line and the broader aluminum conductor line. The
government admitted the competition between insulated aluminum conductor and insulated copper conductor, but contended that
this competition was rapidly disappearing because the price differential was so substantial, the price of insulated aluminum conductor
being only fifty to sixty-five per cent of that of an equal copper
product. 190 Since copper and aluminum are equally efficient functionally, the choice is based on economic factors. Consequently, aluminum,
being cheaper, is rapidly dominating the market for insulated conductor for overhead distribution lines. Even though insulated conductor, both copper and aluminum, may be a line of commerce, the
substantial price differential warrants recognition of a submarket of
insulated aluminum conductor. 191 In addition, the government argued,
regardless of whether insulated aluminum conductor is a line of
commerce, the broader aluminum conductor line so qualifies because
of its peculiar characteristics as to price and physical makeup in
relation to copper conductor. 92
Alcoa, in response, contended that determining insulated aluminum
conductor to be a line of commerce would be inconsistent with the
Brown Shoe decision. Brown Shoe, of course, set out the "practical
indicia" to which one might look to determine whether a particular
market qualifies as a line of commerce. 193 The use of only one factor
in determining a line of commerce, so argued Alcoa, is inconsistent
187. Id. at 510.
188. Id. at 519.
189. 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
190. Brief for Appellant, p. 41, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note

184.
191. Id. at 38-46.

192. Id. at 47-48.
193. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 165, at 325.

1530

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

with an analysis of the entire economic situation as called for in
Brown Shoe. Therefore, the price differential alone is not sufficient
to justify denominating insulated aluminum conductor as a line of
commerce. 9 4 Alcoa argued, further, that the two aluminum conductor
lines could not be combined to form one line of commerce, since
insulated aluminum conductor by itself is not a line of commerce, as
the district court had held. Also, the bare and insulated aluminum
conductor lines do not compete and are not recognized as a separate
economic entity so as to qualify as a submarket within the conductor
market. 195
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that insulated aluminum
conductor and aluminum conductor generally constituted lines of
commerce for purposes of section 7.196 The Court said that there

was sufficient competition between insulated copper and aluminum
conductor to find a single product market, but the competition did
not preclude dividing the copper and aluminum into submarkets. 197
The vital factors in a choice between copper or aluminum insulated
conductor are economic considerations, since aluminum is fifty to
sixty-five per cent more expensive than copper.198 Such a differential
in price warrants separating insulated aluminum conductor into a
separate submarket: "[W]here insulated aluminum conductor pricewise stands so distinctly apart, to ignore price in determining the
relevant line of commerce is to ignore the single, most important,
practical factor in the business." 199
Since the insulated aluminum conductor is a line of commerce,
said the Court, the broader aluminum conductor line likewise qualifies
as a distinct line of commerce, because it is distinct from copper
conductor in characteristics such as price and use. The Court, therefore, held that both insulated aluminum conductor and aluminum
conductor generally constituted proper lines of commerce for the
purpose of section 7.200
The Court found, moreover, the requisite anti-competitive effects
to make the merger a violation of section 7. A basic premise of section
7, the Court said, was that competition will be most vital where there
are many sellers, none of which have any significant share of the
market. Therefore, where concentration is great, as it is in this case,
the importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration
194. Brief for Appellee, pp. 30-38, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
supranote 184.
195. Id. at 28-29.
.-:16: 377 U.S. at 277.
197. Id. at 275.
198. Id. at 276.
199. Ibid.
200. Id. at 277.
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and preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is so great
as to be violative of section 7. Oligopolistic markets create a likelihood
of collusion which can be lessened or eliminated by small but significant competitors.20 '
It is understandable that the Court would be very suspicious of
any acquisitions made by Alcoa in view of the monopolistic history
of the aluminum industry. The industry was still highly concentrated
and even the acquisition of a small competitor could have a substantial effect on competition, especially when that small competitor
has technological skills needed by the larger acquirer.
Of note in Alcoa, as it was in Continental Can, is the Court's use
of the "practical indicia" of Brown Shoe. The Court showed that these
indicia were not to be used numerically, that is, that the proposed
line of commerce defined by the greatest number of indicia is not
necessarily the proper line of commerce in which to analyze the
effect of an acquisition. While the line of commerce composed of
insulated conductor was valid, the distinct prices of copper and aluminum were, by themselves, "sufficiently significant economically" to
justify delineation of insulated aluminum conductor as a separate line
of commerce. Upon consideration, this reasoning seems entirely
proper, in spite of the fact that insulated copper conductor still retains approximately twenty per cent of the market, for it appears
very likely that many utility companies who originally installed
change to aluminum because of the cost of
copper are reluctant 2to
02
complete changeover.
On the other hand, the combining of insulated aluminum conductor
and bare aluminum conductor into a general aluminum conductor line
has been said to be improper since bare aluminum conductor and
insulated aluminum conductor are not reasonably interchangeable in
use.20 3 It would seem, nevertheless, that both types of aluminum
conductors have sufficiently peculiar characteristics as to be considered
20 4
a single line of commerce under the DuPont-GeneralMotors test.
It has also been argued that the Court did not need to analyze
the effects of the merger in the broader aluminum conductor line' for
a probability of substantial lessening of competition could be found
in the insulated aluminum conductor line.m-5 A showing of the high
degree of concentration and a showing that Rome's superior insulating
201. Id. at 280-81.
202. Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-14, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra
note 184.
203. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, supra note 171, at 273 (1964).
204. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
205. The Supreme Court,1963 Term, supranote 171, at 274.
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techniques could substantially increase Alcoa's share of the market
26
might have been sufficient to render the acquisition unlawful.
VII. CONCLUSION

In section 7 litigation, the government will, of course, advocate a
line or lines of commerce in which it can present the strongest case for
a substantial lessening of competition or a tendency toward monopoly.
Therefore, the government will, in fact, be trying to "gerrymander"
2 7
the relevant product or services market.

0

Such action is permissible under the statute. It is not necessary
that the proposed market be a primary area of the merging firms'
business, as long as it is legally sufficient to constitute a line of commerce. "Acquisitions ... will be unlawful if they have the specified
effect in any line of commerce, whether or not that line of commerce
is a large part of the business of any of the corporations involved
in the acquisition." 2 8
As a consequence, a concern cannot defend itself by advocating
another line of commerce as better adapted to measure the effect of
the merger. It must prove that the lines of commerce which the
government advocates are not valid delineations of a relevant product
or services market as it has been interpreted by the courts. In Continental Can, for example, the defendant moved to dismiss, not even
introducing any evidence, and he argued that the market areas which
the government advocated did not have legal sufficiency. 2 9
The real problem, of course, is what makes a line of commerce
legally sufficient. Throughout the judicial development of the concept, the one idea which has always persisted is that a relevant product
or services market must be in accord with "trade realities."2 10 This
concept is elusive as well, but it does indicate complete analysis of
the factual situation. In the two recent cases analyzed, however,
the Court seems to have subordinated this policy to one of finding a
line of commerce where substantial anti-competitive effects exist.
The keys to the concept of "trade realities" appear to be the
various tests which have been used by the courts in demarcating a
line of commerce. The purpose of the statute, however, must always
be considered. If the case, as presented, is not clear-cut in favor
206. Ibid.

207. See Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court vs. Corporate Mergers, FonTuN,
January 1965, p. 165.
208. S. BR. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
209. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
210. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 257 (1963); Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1961).
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of either the government or the defendant, the legislative intent of
prohibiting concentration at its incipiency will weigh heavily in
favor of the government's position.
Of the tests used, the interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity
of demand appears to be the most important. It is a measure of the
competition between certain products or services.
As for the "practical indicia" enumerated in Brown Shoe,211 it is of
importance to realize that the lower courts' analyses in the two
recent cases discussed above, in which the courts emphasized these
practical indicia, were overturned by the Supreme Court. In Continental Can, the Court said that inter-industry competition alone was
sufficient to determine a line of commerce,2 12 while in Alcoa, the
Court held that the price differential between insulated copper con-ductor and insulated aluminum conductor was alone sufficient to
demarcate the relevant market.213 Therefore, it appears that an
analysis applying all of these indicia to a fact situation is not always
a legally sufficient basis on which to determine a line of commerce,
but that the actual competitive situation must be analyzed in each
case, sometimes with the aid of any of the indicia which might be
found to be present or dominant in that particular case. It must be
kept in mind, however, that these factors were originally used by the
lower courts at different times as dominant factors,214 and that
dominance by one in a particular factual situation, even though others
may be present, will probably be determinative.
As a result, a "line of commerce," for purposes of section 7, will
be an area of effective competition as determined by a complete
analysis of the factual situation of each case, but if substantial anticompetitive effects appear inevitable as a result of the acquisition, it
seems that the Court will delineate the line of commerce so as to forestall such effects and will hold the acquisition in violation of section 7.
WnxLI HmE BARR
211.
212.
213.
214.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 165.
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 456 (1964).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 276 (1964).
See note 128 supra and accompanying text.

